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L Introduction
According to one study, an "astounding" 3,815 journal and law
policymaking articles used the terms "judicial activism" or "judicial activist"
during the 1990's.1 Since 2000, "these terms have surfaced in another 1,817
articles-an average of more than 450 per year., 2 The interest in judicial
B.A., University of Texas, 2001; J.D. cum laude, University of Pennsylvania Law School,
2005. I thank Professors Edward Rubin, Kermit Roosevelt, Anita Allen-Castellitto, Frank Goodman, and
C. Edwin Baker for their inspiration, helpful comments, and insights. All errors remain my own.
I
Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and CurrentMeanings of "JudicialActivism," 92
CALIF. L.REV. 1441, 1442 (2004).
2
Id.
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activism demonstrated by these statistics stems from the reality that federal
judges are unelected and serve for life, yet have the power to overturn
decisions of the democratically elected branches of government.3 For a
country devoted to democratic self-rule, this creates a serious tension4 and
brings to mind Rousseau's famous announcement that he would "force them
to be free.",5 Yet despite the worry about judicial activism, or more precisely
6.
judicial policymaking, it remains vitally important to the American political
system for the simple reason that for every Scott v. Sandford,7 there is a
Brown v. Board of Education.8 The necessity for some types of judicial
policymaking but not others makes it important to develop a coherent theory
of the judiciary's proper role in shaping and responding to national debate.
This is particularly true in the area of identifying and protecting
Constitutional rights. Throughout history and into today, American law has
created various hierarchies of people, with individuals at each level
possessing a list of rights unique to that group. The object of this paper is to
show that courts can and must determine the content of those lists without at
the same time undermining democratic self-rule.
In Part II, I show that rights are socially constructed through rational
discourse, meaning that an individual has a right when and only to the extent
people agree he or she has that right. I also show that the creation of rights
often occurs outside the democratic process, and that the Constitution
empowers and requires judges to protect these rights. Thus, the question is
for power, but rather
not whether we will allow the judiciary to make its grab
9
since it has that power, how should judges execute it.
3
See Cass Sunstein, The Philosopher-Justice-FarewellRehnquist, Move Over Scalia, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 19, 2005, at 29 (book review) ("[S]ince the Court has the power to invalidate the
decisions of the elected branches, it is not so easy to reconcile the magnitude of its power with the
national commitment to democratic self-rule.").
4

See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:

INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION

116 (2005) ("(O]nce judges become accustomed to justifying legal conclusions through appeal to realworld consequences, they will too often act subjectively and undemocratically, substituting an elite's
views of good policy for sound law.").
5

JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R.

Masters trans., St. Martin's Press 1978) (1762).

6
See MALCOM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING AND THE MODERN
STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 1-10 (1998) (discussing the nature of and

problems with judge-made public policy).
7
See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (affirming the right of property in a slave),
superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. xI.
8
See Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding that schools could not segregate
children based on race); Barry Friedman, William Howard Taft Lecture: The Importance Of Being
Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1270-71 (2004)
(discussing that for every period of sustained exercise of judicial review, hope can be matched with
instances of failure).
9
See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: Foreword: We The Court, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 169 (2001) (asking whether we should let the Supreme Court "get away with" its grab for power).
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In Part III, I show that the Lochner era jurisprudence failed to
properly execute this judicial power to identify which rights the Constitution
protected. Lochner did not rely on principles to limit judicial discretion, but
instead relied on the personal opinions of judges who did not understand the
socially constructed nature of rights.10
In Part IV, I demonstrate that modem substantive due process
jurisprudence, by explicitly relying on traditionally shared social values to
determine what rights are "fundamental" and require protection, has come
closer to fixing the problems plaguing earlier Due Process Clause
jurisprudence. This Part, however, also argues that modem substantive due
process jurisprudence repeats Lochner's first mistake by failing to articulate
principles that limit judicial discretion when identifying which rights require
protection. I also show in this part that if judges adopt Justice Scalia's rule
to refer only to the "most specific level" when identifying fundamental rights
and the relevant tradition that protects them, judges will commit Lochner's
second error: failing to recognize the socially constructed nature of rightsthat the People can and do create new rights outside the democratic process
that nonetheless deserve judicial protection.
In Part V, I propose and defend a new substantive due process
jurisprudence. When determining whether to uphold a litigant's asserted
right, courts should first define the asserted right using Justice Scalia's "most
specific level" rule. Judges should then uphold the claimed right if a
"substantial minority" of the American people supports protecting this
narrow definition of the right. In writing the opinion, judges should define
the alleged right broadly, such that a tradition rooted deeply in the Nation's
history protects the litigant's rights claim. Furthermore, judges should
justify their decisions to do so by referencing the existence of the supportive
substantial minority, as well as the arguments that minority advances.
I. The Need for JudicialProtectionof ConstitutionalRights
A. The Due ProcessClause Requires the Government to Protect Both
Liberty and Equality
The natural starting place for a discussion of substantive due process
is the text from which it arises."t Substantive due process finds its origins in
10 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
it
See Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition,99 YALE L.J. 1419, 1422 (1990) (book
review) (arguing that according to Bork, "courts are to do no more, but no less, than effectuate the will of
the Framers-as revealed by reading the constitutional text against the background provided by 'debates
at the conventions, public discussion, newspaper articles, dictionaries in use at the time, and the like.'").
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the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution, which
provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."'12 I define liberty as the right
to act and decide
13
how one is to live one's life without external interference.
Although the Due Process Clause only mentions liberty, it also
necessarily requires the government to protect equality. The reason is
simple: protecting one requires protecting the other. 14 Protection of liberty
requires protection of equality because applying laws equally often "serve[s]
to cabin their infringement on liberty."' Indeed, "the constitutional values
of equality and liberty are fundamentally linked by the notion that equal
access to certain institutions and services is a prime component of any
meaningful liberty." 16 Applying the same principles to everyone when
determining whether to grant a liberty right prevents the law from making an
improper or arbitrary distinction among
groups and incorrectly revoking or
17
refusing to recognize a liberty right.
In this way, equality becomes the criterion by which the validity of
rights claims is judged; 8 the conferral or restriction of liberty rights must be
based on arguments to which everyone, including those affected, would
agree. This equal distribution of rights in turn strengthens liberty by
cabining the possibility of arbitrary infringements. Thus, the Due Process
Clause, by expressly protecting liberty, makes equality a Constitutional
principle as well because equality is necessary for obtaining a strong liberty.
To achieve the equality that protects liberty, however, the
government must also provide liberty as an initial matter. Liberty is a
necessary component in the process by which equality is defined and
secured. The discourse ethics of philosopher Jirgen Habermas illustrate this
point. Building on Austin, Habermas states that there are three fundamental
types of statements:
statements about the observable world of facts
amend. XIV, §2.
See Joel Feinberg,'Autonomy, Sovereignty and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?,58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445,473 (1983) ("The reason [in general] for not interfering, unless for the sake of
others, with a person's voluntary acts is consideration for his liberty.").
14
See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Justice Blackmun, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 59, 63 (1998); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575
(2003).
12

U.S. CONST.

13

15
16

Karlan, supra note 13, at 62.
Kenneth Karst, Equality as a CentralPrinciple in the FirstAmendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20,

43--44 (1975).
17
See id. at 60-61 ("Roe helped to make women more equal by giving them the kind of 'control
over [their] reproductive lives' necessary for them to 'participate equally in the economic and social life
of the Nation."' (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973))).
18

But see RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY

122-23 (2000) (arguing that this framework does not "make liberty instrumental to distributional equality
any more than it makes the latter instrumental to liberty: the two ideas rather merge in a fuller account of
when the law governing the distribution and use of resources treats everyone with equal concern").
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(cognitive-objective), statements about one's beliefs, identifies and aesthetic
judgments (expressive-subjective), and statements about social norms
(moral-normative). 19 When they are correct, cognitive-objective statements
are "true," expressive-subjective20 statements are "sincere" and moralnormative statements are "valid.,
Departing from Kant and Kohlberg, however, Habermas argues that
statements cannot be monologically validated. 21 Rather, statements are true,
sincere, or valid only to the extent upon which people agree that they are.22
Each type of statement has its own procedure for determining whether people
agree regarding its truth, sincerity, or validity. 23 Cognitive-truth claims,
claims that involve the correspondence between the world of facts and the
claim, are true if people agree on the correspondence between the meaning
of the words in the claim and the existence of the facts in the world to which
they refer.24 Expressive-subjective claims are sincere if people agree that the
meaning of the words in the claim reflects the intentions, beliefs, and
feelings of the speaker.25 Moral-normative claims are valid if all individuals
agree that the meaning of the words in the claim express the norms they
signify.26 The meaning of statements and their validity are now inextricably
entwined; social agreement on a statement's meaning is necessary to
determine a statement's truth, validity, or sincerity. At the same time,
agreement on the truth, validity, or sincerity of a statement creates new intersubjective meanings and values.27
Such agreement comes easily when it involves the truth of a
cognitive-objective statement such as "I am not a squirrel," or expressivesubjective statements such as "I ran because I was afraid of the fire."
Agreement on the validity of moral-normative claims, however, such as
19

See DAVID INGRAM, HABERMAS AND THE DIALECTIC OF REASON 20-21, 37-39 (1987)

("Buhler's semiotic analysis of language isolated three functions common to all signs: a cognitive
function (the sign as symbol of reality), an expressive function (the sign as a symptom of the sender's
inner experience), and an appellative function (the sign as a signal aimed at influencing the receiver's
behavior.")).
20
Id.
See id. ("[S]ocial engagements of a relatively intransitory nature would presuppose at least
21
some communicative agreement, and the meaning of action would accordingly refer to a public
accomplishment rather than a private episode in the mind of the actor.").
22
Id.
See id. at 20 (arguing that "much of the knowledge guiding our actions consists in aptitudes,
23
skills, and competencies- in other words, tacit know-how- that we would have difficulty describing and
explaining, let alone justifying").
24
Id. at 20, 29-30, 34.
See id. ("Although application of the theory of worlds to social life marks an important
25
advance in conceptualizing intentional action, it still conceives the interaction between subject, nature,
and objective spirit instrumentally . .
Id.
26
27
Id.

13 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 1 (2006)
"Equality means equality of opportunity"; "The right to free exercise of
religion is a fundamental right"; or "Justice is rendering to each what they are
due" is more difficult because all individuals must agree the words actually
signify the relevant social norm, i.e. that equality actually does mean equality
of opportunity or that the right to free exercise of religion actually is a
fundamental right. In a more primitive time in human history, all individuals
would accept the validity of a moral-normative claim based on an appeal to
mythologies, such as ethnic or religious arguments. 28 But this did not create
the universal assent Habermas states is necessary to validate a moralnormative statement because only individuals sharing that ethnic or religious
background would agree with the validity of the statement.
Instead, Habermas argues that agreement must be based on reason on reference to the best argument-because reason is the only universal basis
for justifying action. "Only in a rationalized lifeworld do moral issues
become independent of issues of the good life. Only then do they have to be
dealt with autonomously as issues of justice, at least initially." 29 Reason is
the only universal basis because every individual is capable of accepting
arguments based on reason. Habermas goes on to state that reason is the
only truly universal characteristic of individuals because it is the end result
of a process that all humans can go through, critical identity formation.3 °
G.H. Mead first outlined the idea of a critical process of identity formation,
which argues that the inter-subjective creation of values and meaning
through communication both enables and forces children to create individual
identities.3'
An infant's, toddler's, and child's communication with others such
as mothers, grandparents, and friends requires that child to adopt the roles of
speaker and listener vis A vis those other individuals.32 By adopting the role
of listener, a child is taught the initial values and meanings the community
shares. These values and meanings provide a child with the tools and
building blocks necessary for creating an identity. By adopting the role of
the speaker, the child also acts on the world outside her, deciding how to act
based on her own interpretation of values and meanings that she received as
a listener. Thus, through acting or speaking, the child first determines the
2
See id. at 34 (discussing the idea that individuals act by accepting or rejecting the validity of
certain values or meanings).
29

JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 178 (Christian

Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., M1T Press 1990) (1983).
30
Ingrain, supra note 18, at 104-05.
31
JOHANNA MEEHAN, FEMINISTS READ HABERMAS, 3 (1995); see also Ingrain, supra note 18, at
104-05, 109 (discussing Habermas' idea that critical identity formation is a process undergone by all
humans and that reason is the end result of this process).
32
Meehan, supra note 30, at 3.
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validity of the values and meanings for herself, and enters the world of
meaning and value creation as an individual.33
Notice, that this means Habermas is able to assert that when
individuals act, they do so for a reason. Individuals act by first either
accepting or rejecting the validity of certain values or meanings.34 Thus,
human interaction gives rise to and maintains individual and social identities
"by organizing action around shared values, so as to reach agreement over
criticizable validity claims." 35 For example, a child justifies actions, thereby
creating and maintaining an identity, from compulsion.36 A child's parents
teach him not to yell in the library, and the child, before yelling in the
library, decides how to act based on his interpretation of the values and
meanings he received as a listener. Having determined that this yelling
generates punishment and avoids reward, the child decides not to yell. This
decision itself reinforces the shared value that yelling in the library is bad.
As a child grows older, she encounters more shared values, more
criticizable validity claims, and more abstract identities and roles. As a
result, children are able and forced to accept or reject shared values or
meaning for increasingly abstract reasons, such as ethnic or religious grounds
and are able and forced to adopt more abstract identities and roles.37 At
adolescence, individuals critically analyze the roles assigned to them and
either accept them or reject them as a basis for action.38 Such individuals,
however, still justify action based on compulsions they encounter in their
individual, particularized lives, rather than on universal bases applicable to
all individuals at all times. Habermas argues that an individual who justifies
action by rejecting or accepting the validity of moral-normative claims on
compulsion, rather than universal bases, cannot determine the validity of
moral-normative statements, claims that must be agreed upon by all in order
to be valid. 39 Only a person justifying actions based on reason-someone
with the "specific cognitive and communicative skills needed to recognize
and redeem normative claims"---can create and critique the validity of moralnormative claims. n°
An individual justifies action based on reason only by adopting the
perspective of the "generalized other," a perspective in which an individual
decenters her understanding of reality away from an egocentric perspective
33
34
35
36

Id.
Ingram, supra note 18, at 27-28.
Id.at 115.
Id. at 27, 107-109.

37

Id.

38

Id.
Habermas, supra note 28Error! Bookmark not defined., at 57-58, 178.
Meehan, supra note 30, at 2; Habermas, supra note 28, at 3, 17, 57.

39
40
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and critiques moral-normative statements from another person's
perspective. 4' Decentering requires an individual to "transcend one's
parochial prejudices in reflection and ground one's judgments in first
principles., 42 This transcendence allows an individual to recognize that
identity roles, and the communicative interactions that create them, are
socially constructed through argument, rather than intrinsic to being. A
decentered individual breaks free of the socially constructed nature of these
identity constraints and becomes a fully autonomous individual, one who
chooses solely on rationally justifiable reasons, 43 "by force of the better
argument." 44 This, in turn, enables the individual to engage in the argument
over the validity of moral-normative claims requiring agreement from all
individuals such as the definition and content of "equality" or "fundamental
rights."
If individuals can engage in the debate over the definition and
content of "equality" only from the decentered point of view, one can now
see why liberty is necessary to protect equality; liberty is a necessary
component of the dialogic process by which equality is defined and
assured.45 Because equality is necessary to protect liberty, the Due Process
Clause protects those liberties that enable individuals to engage in the debate
over the definition of equality.
The Lochner era of cases provide a clear example of the full
relationship between liberty and equality. In Coppage v. Kansas,46 the Court
struck down a statute making it a criminal offense for an employer to
prohibit, as a condition for employment, an employee from becoming a
member of a union.47 This law ostensibly would have helped employees'
bargain for better conditions of employment. Although the employer
admittedly had the superior bargaining position, the Court reasoned it was
"from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the
right of private property without recognizing as legitimate those inequalities
48
of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.,
Because the Court ruled the inequality of bargaining position was a natural
and necessary result of a liberty of contract without need for government

41

Ingrain,supra note 18, at 30-31; Meehan, supra note 30, at 3.

42

Ingram, supra note 18, at 131.
Id. at 20, 129-130.

43

"

Id. at 27, 30-31, 131.

45

Dworkin, supra note 17, at 122-23.
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), abrogated by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.

4

177 (1941).
47
48

Id. at 26.
Id. at 17.
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correction, the state could not interfere with the employer's and employee's
• 49
liberty of contract in order to remedy the employee's bargaining position.
Justice Holmes disagreed, reasoning that a state could restrict the
liberty of contract if the restriction would "establish the equality of position
between the parties in which liberty of contract begins. '' 50 Holmes realized
that real contracts do not contemplate the exploitation of one party by
another but are an exchange into which the parties would not enter unless
both were better off after the exchange. Rules establishing equality of
bargaining rights would allow people to make real contracts, an enhancement
of each party's liberty of contract.5 1 Justice Holmes' argument can be
refrained as stating that in some instances, providing equality through the
conferral of new liberties, such as the right to join a union, protects other
liberties, such as the right of contract.52 At the same time, Justice Holmes'
sophisticated understanding of the role of equality in the liberty to contract
came about only through the freedom found in discourse between decentered
individuals.
B. The Socially ConstructedNature of Rights and The Judiciary'sRole in
Protecting Them in a Democracy
There is a precarious balancing act for our democratic government to
perform in fulfilling its Constitutional obligation to protect equality and
liberty. Equality does not demand that every alleged rights claim be granted
because not all rights claims are based on arguments to which everyone,
including those affected, would agree. For instance, in a perfectly working
system, blind people would limit their ability to fly planes53 and AIDS
patients would limit their ability to give blood, because these individuals
would subordinate their desire to engage in these activities to arguments
supporting keeping society safe. Therefore, not all rights claims strengthen
liberty overall by providing equality. Thus, the government must distinguish
constitutionally protected, valid rights it cannot infringe from constitutionally
unprotected, invalid rights it can infringe.54 The supposed salvation of our
49

50

Id.

Id. at 27 (Holmes J. dissenting).

See David Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 383-84 (2003)
(arguing against a purely outcome based analysis of equal protection claims and advocating limited
discussion of only egalitarian or minority-oriented results).
52
Id.
53
See C. Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality Of Respect: The Substantive Content Of
Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 937 (1983) (stating that a blind person can be forbidden from
flying a plane because of what he or she cannot do, that is, see).
54
As noted earlier, valid rights are those liberties which promote equality, as defined by
arguments to which all individuals can agree. Supra p. 4.
51
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democracy is that the government will never get this calculus wrong because
government-imposed limits on liberty will apply to everyone, including those
that make the rule. Put in terms of Habermas' discourse ethics, individuals
justify particular legislation-as with all action--on the basis of shared
values, and one group of individuals will not limit the liberty of another
group unless they would limit their own liberty in the same way.
Democratically enacted legislation will create only those rights that all
people agree meet the criterion of equality, thereby securing liberty as the
Due Process Clause demands.
This view assumes, however, that people, when imposing limits,
actually legislate on the basis of shared values, from the perspective of the
generalized other/decentered point of view. Assuming that the participants
in our democracy operate from this perspective takes a gigantic leap of faith,
and indeed is not empirically true. 6 Instead, our democracy enables the
majority to (1) limit the rights of minorities in ways they would not limit
themselves, and (2) provide benefits to themselves that they withhold from
the minorities, thereby creating an inequality of liberty rights. Thus, as
Rebecca Brown acutely notes, "[W]hat kind of salvation is it if a lack of
shared values makes it possible for one group to decide that something
57
deeply valued only by another is not worth protecting?,
Taking this a step forward, it is insufficient for government merely
to protect rights granted by the People democratically, that is, politically.
Rather, as Habermas shows, the moral-normative statement "(Group) X has
Y right" is valid not when recognized by some democratically elected
legislature, but when all individuals can agree the meaning of the words in
the claim express the norms they signify. Therefore, rights are socially
constructed and exist to the extent individuals in the decentered point of view
agree they exist. Just as importantly, individuals in the decetered point of
view will confer and limit liberty rights based only on arguments to which
everyone, including those affected, would agree.
Thus, decentered
individuals identify only those rights that meet the criterion of equality and
actually strengthen liberty overall.
This analysis has Constitutional implications. As shown above, the
Due Process Clause protects those liberty rights that meet the criterion of
55
See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J. concurring)
(noting that the "salvation" for protection of individual liberties in America is the Equal Protection Clause,
which "requires the democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose
on [the American people]," justifying non-intrusion by the government into "every field of human activity
where irrationality and oppression may theoretically occur").
56
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (showing that democracy, in the past, has not

institutionalized the decentered point of view); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (showing that even
this century, the People are not as decentered as one would hope).
57

Rebecca Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L REv. 1491, 1546 (2002).
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equality, and whose conferral strengthens the liberty of all. Correspondingly,
the rights identified by individuals from the decentered point of view are
rights that meet that criterion. The Due Process Clause obligates government
to protect these rights, even if they are not enshrined in democratic
legislation. Yet, as explained previously, democracy often fails to protect
these rights through legislation, even though individuals from the decentered
point of view have already identified the rights claim as increasing equality
and protecting liberty.
In a democracy, judicial policymaking is often the only
governmental mechanism for protecting these rights. Contrary to Justice
Scalia's pronouncements that the Due Process Clause is meant to prevent the
Court from protecting minority rights,58 the Due Process Clause requires the
judiciary to protect even those minority rights that are not enshrined in
democratically passed legislation.5 9 The failure of democratic process
to do
' 6°
so is precisely "the failure that judicial policymaking can alleviate.
Practically, courts can identify an asserted right as one of these
discursively created rights by identifying "substantial minorities" of people
who agree the asserted right should be protected. A "substantial minority" is
a number of people such that support for the social movement advancing the
right has passed a "tipping point" and will not regress. Because a right exists
to the extent that it is based on arguments to which everyone would agree,
the asserted right effectively exists at the point a right has the support of this
substantial minority. Further, the fact that the movement will not regress in
support verifies the rationality of the arguments underlying the movement's
rights claims and shows it is a matter of when, not if, all individuals will
come to agree that the asserted right meets the criterion of equality and
therefore strengthens liberty. Because these asserted rights meet the criterion
of equality and strengthens liberty overall, the Due Process Clause demands
that the judiciary protect new rights claims supported by substantial
minorities. This is especially so when the call is a close one because the
preferable choice is to force the discriminating majority to convincingly
win
61
the dialogue "rather than to risk allowing an intrusive statute to stand.",

58
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.2 (1989) ("[The Due Process Clause's]
purpose is to prevent future generations from lightly casting aside important traditional values-not to
enable this Court to invent new ones.").
59
See Edward Gary Spitko, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia's Approach to Fundamental
Rights Adjudication, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1337, 1353 (1990) ("The [Fourteenth [A]mendment was meant to
protect minorities from oppression by the majority.").
60
Brown, supra note 56, at 1546.
61
Spitko, supra note 58, at 1347.
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II1. Early JudicialPolicymaking and Substantive Due Process
A. The Problems With Lochner: Too Much JudicialDiscretionand a
Failureto Protect Socially ConstructedRights
In fact, American courts have always claimed the power and duty to
prevent the unconstitutional violation of an individual's rights. In 1798, the
Supreme Court, in striking down an ex post facto law, stated "[a] law that
punished a citizen for an innocent action.. .or a law that takes property from
A and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust
a Legislature with SUCH powers." 62 Twelve years later, the Supreme Court
affirmed its duty to review such legislation and noted the great care required
of a judge when using his or her power to prevent legislative misuse of
government power, stating:
The question, whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the
constitution, is, at all times, a question of such delicacy,
which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative,
in a doubtful case. The court, when impelled by duty to
render such a judgment, would be unworthy of its station,
could it be unmindful of the solemn obligations which that
station imposes... The opposition between the constitution
and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear 63and
strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other.
Whether a current law is incompatible with the Constitution is a
question of delicacy because federal judges are unelected and serve for life,
yet they have the power to overturn the decisions of democratically elected
branches of government.64 The judiciary "is the most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the
Constitution. '65 The job of judges "is to make sense of the legally relevant
sources, recognizing that the messages they receive may prove inconsistent
with their personal or political morality... "66 and then decide only on the
basis of the legally relevant sources.
Due to the indeterminacy of textual meaning, however, the judiciary
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 128(1810).
64
See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 29 ("Since the Court has the power to invalidate the decisions of
elected branches, it is not easy to reconcile the magnitude of its power with the national commitment to
democratic self-rule."); see also Breyer, supra note 4, at 119.
6
Moore v. East City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
6
Ackerman, supra note 10, at 1420.
6
6
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cannot assert that, "as it once did, statutory term[s] . . . convey unique
intrinsic meanings that courts can implement without the need for
interpretation.' '67 The primary legally relevant sources (legal texts) are often
of limited help in guiding judges trying to differentiate between the legal
answer and the answer based on personal or political morality. 68 Rather,
principles of interpretation are needed that help the judge differentiate
between political and legal answers. 69 These principles restrain judicial
discretion and, if properly articulated, will lead judges to correct legal
answers, protecting only those rights that actually enhance equality and
liberty (and are therefore protected by the Due Process Clause).
Looking to the mistakes and successes of past theories enables
modem scholars to develop such principles. To this end, I will show that the
Court's early Due Process Clause jurisprudence (1) failed to develop
principles that limited judicial discretion and (2) did not recognize the
dialectic role citizens play in forming the content of law and rights. 70
The first attempt to develop principles for interpreting the Due
Process Clause occurred when legislatures passed economic regulation in the
late nineteenth century. 7 I The difficulty for judges was determining how to
"analyze . . . what would come to be perceived as an irreconcilable
contradiction between regulation and takings. 7 2 Although the Court had
already held in Calder v. Bull7 3 that the Constitution prohibited class
legislation that took from A and gave to B without due process,7 4 courts were
left without a strong theory of what due process meant. 75 This is also to say
John Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2386, 2396 (2003).
See id. at 2395 n.29 ("Even the strictest modem textualists accept Wittgenstein's premise that,
because words lack intrinsic meaning, communication depends on a community's shared linguistic
practices and understandings.").
69 Ackerman, supranote 11, at 1420.
70
Margaret Jane Radin, Can the Rule of Law Survive Bush v. Gore?, in BUSH V. GORE: THE
QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 110, 124 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) ("The relationship between law and
particular cases is dialectical, not a version of strict entailment .... Legal rules are enacted not only to
achieve ends in a narrow sense, but also to make text of our commitments--to teach us who we are as
citizens, to exhort us to live up to the values we profess, to express who we are and what we value.")
(emphasis added).
71 See generally JOHN V. ORTH,DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 50 (2003) (reviewing
how due process jurisprudence was analyzed in the late nineteenth century when legislation threatened
vested interests and individual entrepreneurships).
67

68

72

MORTON J. HORWrrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF

LEGAL ORTHODOXY 27 (1992).
73 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
74 Id. at 388.
75 See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 65 (1993) (stating without natural law,
a refinement of principles by improving the sophistication of distinctions and vocabulary was a logical
way in which to approach right answers). This remains a good approach. Even though the mythology of
objective truth is dead, it still seems possible to get closer to right answers through more sophisticated
dialogue and refined vocabulary. Like an algorithm approaching zero, knowing we will never touch the
line, we at least always get closer to truth by half.
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that courts were without a theory to describe when granting a previously
unrecognized right would lead to equality, thereby strengthening liberty in
general.
At the time, the Court had developed two theories for determining
when it should recognize a Due Process rights claim. First, the Court
developed a principle of differentiating between rights "affected with a
public interest" and private rights.76 Under this line of cases, legislation
satisfied the Due Process Clause even if it infringed individuals' private
rights to property or liberty as long as the legislation was an exercise of a
right "affected with a public interest." This public/private interest principle
left judges to determine whether a given right was "affected with a public
interest." Second, the Court concurrently used the general welfare principle,
which held that legislation was proper, despite infringing on individuals'
liberty rights, if it was good-faith legislation for the public health, morals,
and safety.77 Again, the theory left judges to determine whether the
legislature reasonably believed the legislation promoted the general welfare.
The line of cases implementing the public/private interest principle
began with Citizens' Savings & Loan Association v. Topeka,78 decided in
1874. In Loan Association, the Supreme Court struck down legislation
passed by the Kansas legislature authorizing municipalities to issue bonds
and use the money to help local businesses. 79 Citizens and a loan association
sued a municipality issuing bonds under the act, arguing the city was simply
taking money from them and giving it to private business owners.80 They
argued it was a violation of the naked takings doctrine, expressed in Calder,
prohibiting class legislation that limited one party's liberty to contract and
right to property for the benefit of another group of people. 81 Creating such
perceived inequality of liberty,82 they argued, was outside the scope of
Congress' proper police powers.
The Court struck down the act as an improper taking but created an
exception to Calder's strict prohibition on class legislation.83 In deciding
Loan Association, the Court held that the Due Process Clause permitted
naked takings if the taking was the result of an exercise of a right "affected

78

Citizens' Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1874).
Horwitz, supra note 71, at 28.
Citizens' Savings & Loan Ass'n 87 U.S. 655.

79

Id. at 659-60.

76
77

so

Id. at 659.
Id.; see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 138 (1810) (stating that no State shall pass any bill
of attainder, ex post facto law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
386, 388 (1798) (stating that a law that takes property from A and gives it to B is a law that must be
prohibited by legislation as forbidden by general principles of law and reason).
Id.
82
Id. at 661.
83
81
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with a public interest;" 84 defining a right "affected with a public interest" as
one held by the People and exercised for their benefit.85 In effect, the Court's
determination that the right was affected with a public interest served to
distinguish legitimate legislation from legislation that was actually a private
taking meant to benefit one specific class.
The Court in Loan Association found that the legislation sought to
help businesses "not of a public character," and therefore held that the
86
municipality was not exercising a right "affected with a public interest."
The Court upheld the citizens' right to property and determined "that in this
class of cases the right to contract must be limited by the right to tax"
because such laws "pervert[ed] the right of taxation, which can only be
exercised for a public use, to the aid of individual interests and personal
purposes of profit and gain., 87 Thus, the Court had established that (1)
legislation was an exercise of a right "affected with a public interest" if it
regulated or benefited a public, rather than private, business, and (2) the
exercise of such a right trumped individuals' private rights.
Two years later, the Court again used this public/private interest
principle in Munn v. Illinois88 to uphold legislation fixing maximum prices
for the storage of grain in warehouses.89 Grain warehouse operators claimed
this violated their right to contract freely with their laborers.90 The majority
of the Court disagreed, noting that "when private property is devoted to a
public use, it is subject to public regulation," 9' and analogized grain
warehouse operators to individuals in traditionally public and regulated
industries such as "the common carrier, or the miller, or the ferryman, or the
innkeeper, or the wharfinger, or the baker, or the carman, or the hackneycoachman." 92 The majority concluded that the public's right to control
property in which it had an interest trumped grain warehouse operators' right
to property and contract. 93 Grain warehouse operators had to "submit to be
controlled by the public. '"94

8

95

Id. at 662.

Classic examples are the right of municipalities to tax their residents to raise funds for trash

collection, or the right of government to regulate power utilities companies.
86
Citizens' Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 659 (1874).
87
Id.
88
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
9
90
91

Id. at 135-36.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 131-32.

92

Id.

93
94

Id.at 133.
Id.at 124.
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In an all too common display of the looseness of analogy, 95 the
dissent did not attack the majority's theory of the legislature's police power
but rather disagreed with the majority's application of the law to the facts.96
The dissent found that grain warehouses were not an industry affected with a
public interest because, unlike the common carrier who depended on the use
of the King's road or the miller in hoary England who depended on the use
of the lord of the manor's mill, grain warehouse operators did not use any
rights or privileges conferred by the government. 97 As a result, the dissent
held the maximum hours legislation was not the exercise of a right "affected
with a public interest," and was prohibited by the Due Process Clause.98
Barely in its infancy, the public/private interest principle already showed its
weakness as a comprehensive theory for differentiating between
constitutionally protected and unprotected rights.
Over the course of the next fifty years the American economy
demanded more regulation in response to increased industrialization and
inequality in the workplace. The corresponding diversity of cases coming
before the Court pushed the Court's application of the principle towards
licentiousness." The Court recognized this problem in Tyson & Bro. 0'
United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton,1
stating that the distinction
"furnishes at best an indefinite standard, and attempts to define it have
resulted, generally, in producing little more than paraphrases, which
themselves require elucidation."' 10 1 Still, the Court went on in United
Theatre to strike down a law regulating the resale of theater tickets because
theaters were not public businesses. 0 2
In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,10 3 Justice Brandeis attempted to
show the absurdity the approach had reached by the time he came to the
bench. He conducted a lengthy and fact-filled analysis of the importance of
the ice-making industry to Oklahoma to determine whether it was a public or
private business.' 0 4 Noting that the mean nominal temperature in Oklahoma
during January was thirty-eight degrees, and that "so far as appears no
natural ice is harvested in the state for commercial purposes," Justice
95 See Kathleen Sullivan, Post-LiberalJudging: The Roles of Categorizationand Balancing, 63
U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297 (1993) (discussing the numerous different applications of intermediate
scrutiny).
96 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 145 (1876).
97 Id. at 148-49.
98
Id. at 151-52.
99 See Horwitz, supra note 71, at 30 (discussing how judges came to view the law and the courts
to be an instrument of policy that can bring about social change).
too Tyson & Bros. United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
101 Id. at 430.
102

Id. at 445.

103

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).

104

Id. at 277-78.
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Brandeis concluded that ice making was apublic business in Oklahoma and
the legislature could regulate the industry.' Due to the increased variety of
cases forced by the changing social values and circumstances,
10 6 the Court
discarded the distinction two years later in Nebia v. New York.
As noted, the Court had contemporaneously developed a "general
welfare" principle to identify those rights claims the Due Process Clause
protected from legislative infringement.' 7 In Mugler v. Kansas,0 8 the Court
upholding a temperance law in 1887, concluded that legislation was proper
despite infringing on individuals' Constitutional rights to property and
contract, if (1) it was good-faith legislation for the public health, morals, and
safety, and (2) was reasonably tailored to protect the public health, morals,
and safety.'09 If the legislature could reasonably believe the legislation
benefited society as a whole rather than one class of people, courts were to
uphold the legislation.11 ° This test of reasonableness served to ensure that
legislation facially providing for the general welfare was not legislation
whose "real object is not to protect the community, or promote the general
well-being, but, under the guise of police regulation, to deprive the owner of
his liberty and property, without due process of law."' ' Mugler was thus
interested in prohibiting class legislation that was precluded by Calder's
prohibition on naked takings, 1 2 but allowed taking from an individual for the
benefit of society as a whole.
Nine years later, the landscape changed dramatically with Holden v.
Hardy.!1 3 In Holden, the Court upheld a Utah law limiting the maximum
number of hours miners could work in a day as good-faith legislation for the
public health. 1 4 Strict adherence to Calder's or Mugler's public welfare
10

Id. at 289.
See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 86 (1998) (discussing how the Nebbia decision no longer made it
necessary for courts to determine whether the business regulated was purely private); Horwitz, supra note
71, at 30; see also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 510, 510-11 (1934) (stating that the right to contract
can still be regulated by the government if the law complies with due process and protects public welfare);
Gillman, supra note 74, at 180 (stating that the court in Nebbia announced that there is no closed class or
category of businesses affected with the public interest).
107 See Horwitz, supra note 71, at 28 (stating that in the 1870s, judges looked to the law of
nuisance which provided the categories for determining when it was legitimate for the State to regulate on
behalf of the health, safety, and morals of its citizens).
108 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
109 Id. at 661.
106

110

Id. at 669.

III
112

Id.
See id. at 662 ("There is no justification for holding that the state, under the guise merely of
police regulation, is here aiming to deprive the citizen of his constitutional rights.").
113
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
114
See id. at 391 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897)) (describing case law
showing a consistent prohibition against class legislation). In Holden, the court recognized that the liberty
to contract arose from the right to property, a proposition initially set forth in Allgeyer. "In the privilege
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principle would have required striking down the legislation because the Utah
statute infringed the rights of one class of citizens (the employers) to
improve the rights of another class of citizens (the miners), rather than the
general public.' 15 Instead, the Court held that the test for whether legislation
violated the Due Process Clause was not whether the legislation
indiscriminately and reasonably protected health of the general public, but
whether "the legislature has adopted the statute in exercise of a reasonable
discretion, or whether its action be a mere excuse for an unjust
discrimination."'1 6 The Court went on to uphold the maximum hours law,
even though it only benefited miners.' 17
Holden was a significant shift. The addition of the qualifier "unjust"
to the word "discrimination" fundamentally altered Mugler's general welfare
principle. 18 Under Mugler, the fact that legislation affected a select group of
people rather than the general public made the legislation per se
unconstitutional. But increased industrialization and inequality, demanding
more regulation, changed the Court's understanding of the nature of the
liberty of contract. 1 9 Justice Brown, writing for the majority in Holden,
stated that the use of the police powers "has doubtless been greatly expanded
... owing to an enormous increase in the number of occupations which are
dangerous, or so far detrimental to the health of employees as to demand
special precautions for their well-being and protection."'120 With this change
of understanding and circumstance, there came a need for readjusting the
balance of the opposing values within the general welfare principle. Thus, in
landscape, the Court developed
response to a changing social and economic
2
1
Holden.
in
test
legislation
the reasonable
Now, under Holden, if the legislation was "reasonable," meaning
likely to improve the health, safety, or welfare of a group who, in the Court's
opinion, needed the legislature's help, the law would not be unjust
of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring, holding, and selling property, must be embraced

the right to make all proper contracts in relation thereto." Providing this connection rooted judicial review
of legislation regarding the liberty to contract and the judicial review of naked takings performed since
Calder v. Bull and the earliest American cases. As seen, the Court consistently struck down legislative
interference with the right to property, and now the liberty to contract, unless the general public had an
interest in the legislation.
115 Id. at 380--81.
116
Id. at 398 (emphasis added).
117
Id.
18
Id. at 383.
119 Horwitz, supra note 71, at 30; see also Gillman, supra note 74, at 122 (noting that the use of
police powers expanded because of the growing number of dangerous occupations (citing Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898))).
120 Holden, 169 U.S. at 391-92.
121 Id. at 392; see also Gillman, supra note 74, at 122 (stating that regulations that are "general"
and "necessary to the common good and general welfare" are a valid exercise of the police power of the
State).
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discrimination, and the law would be upheld despite the fact that it might
benefit only one group of society. 122 Holden left it to judges to determine the
"reasonableness" of legislation, 123 but, by allowing class legislation as long
as the Court found it to be reasonable and not "undue," Holden's
reasonableness principle enabled the Court to alter its understanding of the
content of rights, such as the liberty of contract, as it saw necessary to give
greater weight to 1newly
arising equality values (which were often reflected in
24
legislation).
class
The Court later took advantage of the flexibility found in Holden's
reasonableness principle and upheld maximum hours legislation for
manufacturing laborers, 25 and upheld legislation that limited how many
hours women could work because it protected "not merely her own health,
but the well-being of the race,"'' 26 which at the time many feminists
considered a progressive victory. 27 Eventually, the Court broadly expanded
the protection of the Due Process Clause by applying Holden's
28 In Meyer v. Nebraska, 29
reasonableness principle to non-economic cases.
and then in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 30 the Court held the Constitution
protected parents' right to control the education of their children. In Meyer,
22
Id. at 397; see also Gillman, supra note 74, at 122 (stating by the 1890s two possible rationales
existed for the Court to justify special treatment for particular classes: (1) emphasizing something about
the particular group that involved traditional police power concerns of health and safety or (2) that market
inequalities per se justified government involvement); but see David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era
Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L. J. 1,
24-25 (2003) (arguing that Holden was one of the last cases decided on class legislation grounds, and the
Court soon shifted to a Due Process jurisprudence).
123 See David D. Meyer, Justice White And The Right Of Privacy: A Model Of Realism
And
Restraint, 52 CATH. U. L. REv. 915, 920 (2003) (asserting that finding validation of a claimed right in "the
concept of ordered liberty" or in "history and tradition" was essential to ensure that judges were not
overstepping their bounds).
124 Id. at 951.
125 See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 200, 426 (1917) (upholding a restriction on the maximum
number of hours industrial workers could work in a day as legislation needed to protect the health of the
workers).
126 See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (declaring "history discloses the fact that
woman has always been dependant upon man . . . she is properly placed in a class by herself and
legislation designed for her protection may be sustained," and adding that "[t]he two sexes differ in
structure of the body, in the functions to be performed by each ... in the influence of vigorous health
upon the future well-being of the race ... (and) [t]his difference justifies a difference in legislation").
127 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements On
ConstitutionalLaw in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2116 (2002) (stating that "[m]ost
feminists as well as progressives supported this kind of protective legislation").
128 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) ("The established doctrine is that this
liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action
which is arbitrary... "); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) ("[R]ights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state.").
129
130

Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 536.
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the Court held that legislation prohibiting schools from teaching languages
other than English was unconstitutional because the legislation was
unreasonable, stating "[m]ere knowledge of the German language cannot
reasonably be regarded as harmful."'' Similarly, in Pierce, the Court held
that legislation prohibiting parents from sending their children to private
32
school was unconstitutional because the legislation was unreasonable,
stating "the [legislation at issue] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
to direct the upbringing and education of children
parents and guardians
133
under their control."
Thus, even though this approach allowed judges greater discretion, it
had the advantage of enabling judges to change with context, time and their
increasingly sophisticated understanding of the relationship between liberty
and equality. The decisions were also not completely unrestrained; all of
these decisions were modifications of Mugler's general welfare principle.
However, other rulings after Holden's divergence from Mugler show
it granted judges too much discretion (and too little guidance) in identifying
and granting rights protected by the Due Process Clause. 134 The Court
withdrew protective legislation for women, citing improvements in the
equality of women, 135 and upheld the forced sterilization of an inmate
because "three generations of imbeciles are enough."' 136 Thus, the cases
coming after Holden indicate the principle sometimes threatened to undo any
limits on the police power and failed to establish principles giving judges
proper guidance. 137 Without guiding principles, judges were unable to
distinguish between political answers and legal answers, instead rendering
decisions based on their own opinions and desires.
This problem came to a head in Lochner v. New York. 138 In Lochner,
not only were the Justices left to their own opinions and beliefs (and
therefore unable to distinguish the political answers from the legal ones), but
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 536.
1
Id. at 534.
134 Meyer, supra note 122, at 920
135 See Adkins v. Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525, 554 (1923)
(declaring the Act of September 19, 1918, unconstitutional on the basis that parties have an equal right to
obtain from each other the best terms they can as a result of private bargaining). Although an argument
could be made that Adkins was struck down because it was a minimum wage law, whereas Muller was a
maximum hours law that intruded less on the employer's and employee's liberty to contract, this
distinction was only raised by Chief Justice Taft in the dissent in Adkins. The majority in Adkins focused
more on the fact that women no longer needed protection, yet the legislation continued to abridge their
liberty to contract.
136 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
137 See Gillman, supra note 74, at 124 (recognizing that "[e]xpanding the police powers to justify
legislation that advanced the physical well-being of only certain workers threatened to explode the
prevailing distinction between legitimate and illegitimate uses of the police power.").
138 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 72 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
131

132
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they failed to understand the socially constructed nature of rights. As a
result, the Justices, left to their own discretion, refused to protect rights that
the Due Process Clause required them to protect.
In Lochner, the New York legislature had implemented new
legislation, similar to that found in Holden, limiting the number of hours
bakers could work in a day. 139 This legislation was a response to the
growing inequality of bargaining positions between employers and
employees and was the result of the public's recent recognition that granting
contract rights to employee's was necessary to improve the equal application
of law (thereby protecting liberty overall). The Court could have upheld the
legislation as "reasonable" under Holden. However, the majority refused to
extend the protection afforded to miners in Holden and struck down the
law.14° The Court reasoned that even though the People, through discourse
and political action, had clearly created new liberty rights that strengthened
equality, the legislature unreasonably infringed on the employer's and
employee's rights to contract because the inequality of bargaining position
was a natural and necessary part of the right to contract.
Professor Strauss correctly states that the majority's opinion was the
result of "a lack of humility: an inability, or refusal, to understand that
although they were vindicating an important value, matters were more
complicated than they thought." 141 The Justices failed to recognize that the
People had decided the inequality of bargaining positions was not natural,
and that true contracts do not contemplate exploitation. Unaware that rights
exist when a substantial minority has decided that the right promotes
equality, thereby strengthening liberty overall, and unguided by limiting
principles that could have corrected this unawareness, the majority found that
the legislation was unreasonable because baking, unlike mining, was not
dangerous enough to warrant protective legislation. This hubris and lack of
principles prevented the Justices from rendering a decision recognizing that
the People had created new rights to counteract the growing inequality
wrought by industrialization, and that as a result, the Due Process Clause
demanded protection of these rights.
Thus, Lochner's mistake was two fold. First, because the Holden
analysis was limited only by what judges determined was "reasonable"
legislation, it gave judges too much discretion. 142 Second, the Justices
139

Id. at 52.

140

See id. at 64 (finding a state law that mandated maximum hours for bakers unconstitutional).
Strauss, supra note 50, at 386 (concluding "that is why Lochner deserves the reputation it has

141

today").

142 See Meyer, supra note 122, at 920 ("For White, this had been the lesson of the Lochner era, in
which the Supreme Court enforced the Justices' own notions of 'reasonable' lawmaking under the guise
of substantive due process, invalidating wide swaths of employment and economic regulations now
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misused this discretion in Lochner because they failed to recognize that the
Due Process Clause requires the judiciary to protect new rights created by
43
the People, even those not yet made law through democratic processes.
By the time West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish'44 overturned the Holden era of
cases in 1938, scholars 45had lost faith in the Court's ability to engage in
substantive due process.
B. The Failureof ProceduralDue Process
Frustrated with the Mugler/Holden line of cases, scholars advocated
procedural due process in an attempt to rein in judicial power and
discretion. 46
"The idea seems as simple as it sounds reasonable:
governmental action that burdens groups effectively excluded from the
political process is constitutionally suspect.' ' 147 Variations on this theory of
judicial policymaking appeared as the antidiscrimination principle and equal
protection analysis, which go into further detail about how to identify
governmental action burdening groups, such as homosexuals, that are
effectively excluded from the political process, but not groups who are "just
a temporary political loser," like burglars or insurance salesmen. 148 These
considered routine and ultimately provoking a humbling 'face-off between the Executive and the Court in
the 1930's."').
143 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 883 (1987) (discussing
Lochner's inappropriate use of common law as a baseline for defining protected rights).
14 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
145 See Cushman, supra note 105, at 82-83 (discussing this view held by a "bevy of [then]
contemporary Court-watchers").
146 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 6 (1980)
(discussing the role of procedural due process in the Supreme Court today).
147 Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-BasedConstitutional Theories, 89 YALE
L.J. 1063, 1073 (1980).
148 Guido Calabresi makes two good points, noting that equal protection as practiced by the Court
is more narrow than both the antidiscrimination and Ely's approach, and that one way to tell when a group
is improperly singled out by the political process is to identify burdens that group bears that other groups
do not.
I should emphasize here that the principle ... is antidiscrimination, not equal protection. The
issue is one not of equality, but of when the people put burdens on themselves, on those who by
and large can protect their fundamental interests through the legislative process, and when,
instead, the people put burdens on those whose fundamental interests the legislature can readily
ignore. As a result, Type II judicial review does not have any difficulty, in principle, with
affirmative action or even with so-called reverse discrimination.
Guido Calabresi, AntidiscriminationAnd ConstitutionalAccountability (What The Bork-Brennnan
Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 99-100 (1991). As an aside, Judge Calabresi is correct in noting the
differences between the approaches, but this seems to be the result of the Court's application of equal
protection, rather than any theoretical problem within equal protection analysis. Viewed through the lens
of positive rights, it is arguable that there is no theoretical barrier to upholding affirmative action under
the equal protection clause.
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methods seem to require judges to make merely descriptive, rather than
normative claims: this law burdens one group differently
than others in a
149
fundamental manner and so must be struck down.
However, none of these theories prevent judges from making
normative substantive decisions. 150
As Professor Tribe notes, "any
constitutional distinction between laws burdening homosexuals and laws
burdening [burglars], must depend on a substantive theory of which groups
are exercising fundamental rights and which are not."' 5 1 Sincere moral
feeling cannot help us make the distinction because it is often sincere moral
belief that justifies the improper
stereotypes on which improperly
15 2
discriminatory laws are based.
Even though Rebecca Brown argues that whether a manner is
fundamental can be found by determining whether the group making the rule
would similarly burden themselves, she notes that the problem simply
becomes defining the level of generality at which the burden should be
defined. 53 Should the burden be defined as being forced to refrain from
homosexual sodomy, or to refrain from having privacy? 54 Each of these
determinations is a substantive one, and procedural due process is unable to
vitiate normative decision-making from the judicial process as it claims it
does. In fact, rooting a decision in procedural due process or equal
protection, by proclaiming that everyone has this individual's liberty right

149

See Brown, supra note 56, at 1553 (discussing the notion that the determination that a rule-

making group would put the burden on themselves is sometimes difficult, as in the case of abortion, where
men are making a rule they could not possibly impose on themselves). This is purportedly solved by
resort to analogy: does the law similarly require men to donate organs to the sick? However, this can lead
to an analogical crisis, a situation where there is a reasonable disagreement over the proper analogy. This
problem traces itself back to the more general problems with process review discussed in this paper, i.e.
the problems of level of generality and identification of the group burdened.
150 See Karlan, supra note 13, at 59 ("Moreover, I think that many scholars may be overstating the
sharpness of the line drawn between substantive due process claims and equal protection claims.").
151 Tribe, supra note 146, at 1075; see also Michael Sandel, Law, Community, and Moral
Reasoning: Moral Argument And Liberal Tolerance:Abortion And Homosexuality, 77 S. CAL. L. REV.
521 (1989) (discussing the United States Court of Appeals' use of this type of substantive theory in
Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985)); Cass Sunstein, Response: Liberal
ConstitutionalismAnd Liberal Justice, 72 TEX. L. REV. 305, 310 (1993) ("[Jjudicial enforcement is most
readily defensible when democratic concerns come to the fore."); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 771 n.11 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that "abortion might conceivably be assimilated
either to the tradition regarding women's reproductive freedom in general... or to the tradition regarding
protection of fetuses." (citing Laurence Tribe & Michael Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 UCHI. L. REV. 1057, 1091 (1990))).
152 See Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L. J. 131, 139 (1981) (discussing the
repercussions in the event that the sincere assertion of a moral belief were to end legal inquiry).
153 See Brown, supra note 56, at 1546 ("The antidote, then, would be for a court ... to adjust the
level of generality at which the restriction is imposed in an effort to test the legislators' true willingness to
live under the laws they pass.").
154 See id. (discussing at what level of generality a burden should be defined).
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claim and
(however defined), actually gives greater protection to the liberty
55
enhances the power of jurists' substantive normative decisions.1
IV. The Modem Approach: Explicitly Relying on Socially Constructed
Shared Values, But Repeating the Mistakes of Lochner
Due to procedural due process' failure, we see that legal scholarship
has returned to the conclusion from which it has run for the past one hundred
years. 156 Judges not only can, but must engage in substantive due process.
Thus, today "[wle find a Court that may vigorously divide on how and when
to exercise the authority of judicial policymaking, but that no longer seems to
question the prerogatives of that authority as such."' 57 If the debate about
whether judges can engage in substantive due process is over, theory must
still explain when and how judges should engage in substantive due
process. 158 Responding to this challenge, the Court has developed a modem
substantive due process jurisprudence.
The modem approach to substantive due process, first conceived in
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman' 59 as the Court marking "the
balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of
the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society,"'16 is well-articulated in Washington v. Glucksberg.161
The
established method of substantive due process analysis has two primary
features: the Due Process Clause "specially protects those fundamental
rights and liberties which are, objectively, [1.] 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition,"' (so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental,) and [2.] "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
155

See Sandel, supra note 150, at 531-31 (discussing the minimalist's case for neutrality).

156

See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Foreword, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10

(2003) (discussing the relationship between constitutional law and culture). In fact, many scholars have
noted legal scholarship's seemingly cyclical return to early twentieth century jurisprudence. See Barry
Friedman, Conservative and Progressive Legal Order: The Cycles Of Constitutional Theory, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 149, 150 (2004) ("Progressives at the turn of the twenty-first century are echoing
criticisms offered by Progressives one hundred years earlier."); see also Strauss, supra note 50, at 386
(stating that "[tihe failings of the Lochner era may, in the end, have been more quotidian than is generally
supposed. The problem was not that the Court misconceived the judicial role or did not understand how
to interpret the Constitution.").
157
Post, supra note 155, at 10.
158 See id. at 84 (arguing that "[i]nstead of pursuing the chimerical objective of neutrality, the
Court would do better to analyze the conditions under which courts should properly make cultural
judgments.").
159 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
'60
Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
161 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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were sacrificed.' ' 162 If the asserted liberty interest is deeply rooted in the
country's history and tradition, or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
the state has to show a compelling reason for narrowly tailoring a limit on
the exercise of the right. 16 ' That is,the State's limitation of the right must
pass "strict scrutiny." Strict scrutiny is often referred to as being strict in
theory, but fatal in fact because the Court has rarely found any State interest
compelling enough to limit fundamental rights. 64 If the asserted liberty
interest is not fundamental, the State need only show a rational reason for
limiting the exercise of the right or pass "rational basis" scrutiny.
This approach is a great improvement over the jurisprudence the
Court developed in Loan Association, Mugler, and Holden. The early
substantive due process jurisprudence relied solely on judges to determine
whether legislation properly limited a claimed right. This jurisprudence
failed to properly restrain judicial discretion, resulting in conflicting
decisions such as Holden and Lochner.
The modem approach similarly recognizes the need for judicial
policymaking but, at the same time, limits judicial discretion by forcing
judges to look to an objective, external factor in determining the proper
Constitutional bounds of governmental power; judges look to whether the
People themselves have decided the claimed right is an important one the
Constitution protects. 65 The relative constitutional importance and validity
of the claimed right, as determined by the People rather than judges, then
determines in large part the reasonableness of the legislation (or at least
identifies the proper standard of reasonableness by which to judge the
legislation). This is a good approach because, as shown in Part 11, "the
Constitution signifies that the political choice collectively made by the
American people should inform the Court's vision of law."' 166 The People
are the initial definers and creators of Constitutional rights, and "[i]t makes
no sense to imagine constitutional law as an enterprise distinct from
politics.. .it would be monstrous to imagine such law as wholly divorced
from the political perspectives of the American people."' 67 By explicitly
162

Id. at 720-21 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Snyder v.

Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
163
Id. at 702.
164 See Angelo N. Ancheta, Contextual Strict Scrutiny and Race-Conscious Policymaking, 36
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 21, 21 (2005) ("The Court's most exacting standard of judicial review reflected a
'scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."').
165

See Gregory C. Cook, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia's Attempt To Impose A Rule Of Law On

Substantive Due Process, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 853, 865-66 (1991) ("[f]ollowing... specific
tradition will force the Court to consult the nation's morality rather than its own, providing a more
legitimate decision.").
166 See Post, supra note 155, at 102.
167 Robert Post, Sustaining the Premiseof Legality: Learning to Live With Bush v. Gore, in BUSH
V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 96,97 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002).
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recognizing this, the modem approach takes a large step towards limiting
judicial discretion, while making the judiciary's exercise of power more
compatible with democracy.
Although this seems straightforward enough, there is a crucial
ambiguity remaining in need of clarification. As the Court has stated it, "we
have required in substantive-due-process cases a 'careful description' of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest."'8 The Court has claimed that such
'careful descriptions' are necessary to avoid the drawing of arbitrary lines
and instead provide "[alppropriate limits on substantive due process." 169
Ironically, this process of "careful description of the asserted fundamental
liberty interest" actually voids any limits on substantive due process by
introducing a tremendous amount of judicial discretion into the calculus.
As many scholars have noted, the process of defining a right "can
never be performed as a matter of pure logic; it will always involve
judgment."170 Judges' "careful descriptions" are inseparable from individual
judge's value judgments. Yet how a judge articulates these descriptions
often ends the litigation.' 71 The more broadly the asserted right is described,
the more likely a judge can identify the alleged right as either implicit in the
Nation's ordered liberty or protected by a relevant tradition rooted in the
Nation's history, and deem the asserted right fundamental. 72 That is, the
more broadly the asserted right is defined, the more likely strict scrutiny
applies to limitations on the asserted right. Because the application of strict
a
scrutiny versus rational basis is often the end of the matter, 73 whether 174
claimed right is defined narrowly or broadly will often settle the litigation.
Yet modem substantive due process jurisprudence fails to inform judges of
either when to describe asserted fundamental rights and extant traditions
narrowly or broadly, or "how much weight should be assigned to rule-of-law

168 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).

Moore v. East City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
170 Steven R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia's Due Process TraditionalismApplied To Territorial
Jurisdiction: The Illusion OfAdjudication Without Judgment, 33 B.C. L. REv. 981, 1029-30 (1992); see
also Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generalityin the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1057, 1091 (1990) (discussing the difficulties that arise when the Court consults a "relevant
tradition" to define a fundament right).
171 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 762 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that "the kind and degree of
justification that a sensitive judge would demand of a State would depend on the importance of the
interest being asserted by the individual").
172 See Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the FirstAmendment, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 901, 917 (1993) (discussing the "need to choose the level of abstraction" when identifying
rights).
173 Supra, p. 25.
174 See Spitko, supra note 58, at 1338 ("The level of generality at which the Supreme Court
defines liberty interests is important because it, along with the Court's definition of tradition, wholly
determines whether the due process clause protects an asserted liberty interest.").
169
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75
virtues, as. opposed to constitutional culture," when describing those rights.1
As. a result, it allows "careful descriptions" inherently and heavily tinged
claims of asserted rights,
with the judge's value judgments to adjudicate
176
failing to adequately limit judicial discretion.
For example, in Casey, the Court considered several limitations
placed on the abortion right, upholding 24-hour waiting periods, parental
consent provisions, and recordkeeping procedures, while striking down
spousal notifications as an undue burden on the right of privacy. Justice
Kennedy famously described the asserted fundamental liberty right broadly,
stating the Constitution protects the right of an individual "to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life."'177 Because the spousal notification legislation limited this
broadly defined right, the Court struck down the legislation. Yet for reasons
unarticulated at best and unconvincing at worst, a unanimous Court in
Glucksberg failed to similarly define the right to die, a right involving issues
over the meaning of life substantially comparable to the abortion right of
privacy. 178 By narrowly defining the right without specifying a principle for
why it did so, the Court not only betrayed Justice Kennedy's liberal vision,
but also showed how the modem substantive due process approach of
"careful descriptions" invites the same unrestrained decision-making as the
Lochner Court.
Justice Scalia attempted to resolve this problem in footnote six of
Michael H. v. Gerald D.179 There, Justice Scalia put forth the claim that the
Constitution requires judges, when defining rights, to "refer to the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection
to, the asserted right can be identified."'' 8 0 His justification for this rule is
"narrowly pragmatic: It will keep activist judges in line."'181 Justice Scalia
argues that any other rule, either allowing judges to decide the level of
generality themselves or allowing judges to define the right and relevant
tradition broadly, will "permit judges to dictate rather than discern the

society's views." 182

While Justice Scalia's approach is laudable because it retains modem

Post, supra note 155, at 11.
See Greenberger, supra note 169, at 1023 ("The reality, however, is that Justice Scalia's
commandment of specificity is not the neutral rule of law he claims it to be.").
177 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.").
178 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997) (noting "[t]hat many of the rights
175
176

and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the
sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.").
179 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
180
181
182

Id.
Greenberger, supranote 169, at 1023.
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
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substantive due process' attempt to restrain judges by reference to the
external criterion of the People's political perspective, 183 there are two
problems with his approach. First, defining the right narrowly merely
exacerbates the hermeneutic problem judges already face under the modem
approach.'8 4 Second, narrowly defining these rights forces judges to abdicate
their constitutional role.
Part II of this article provides the basis for the first of these critiques,
the "hermeneutic problem." As shown in Part II, individuals' understandings
of the world and words cannot exist apart from the context in which those
individuals form. 85 However, modem substantive due process jurisprudence
requires judges to abandon this context in their attempt to identify the
traditions rooted in our Nation's history. More disturbingly, it is necessary
for judges not only to engage in the impossible task of ignoring their own
context and understanding, but also to recreate the global understandings
those past individuals possessed. 86 Such creativity is the only way "to
bridge the gaps between that world and ours.', 87 This creativity introduces
the very judicial discretion that Justice Scalia's approach intends to restrain.
Although the hermeneutic problem affects the modem approach no
matter how the claimed right and relevant tradition are defined, defining the
right narrowly as Justice Scalia advocates exacerbates the problem. 8 8 It is
much harder to determine whether society in the past protected the right of
minor immigrants to be released to the temporary custody of responsible
adults, 89 than to determine whether society protected the right to be free
from incarceration without due process of law.' 9° Justice Scalia's approach
invites, rather than excoriates, judicial discretion.
Second, even assuming Justice Scalia's approach could overcome
the hermeneutic problem, Lochner teaches a lesson to judges who might
183

See Jamin B. Raskin, Roe v. Wade and the Dred Scott Decision: Justice Scalia's Peculiar

Analogy in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, I AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 61, 82-83 (1993) ("Justice Scalia's
own method of ascertaining 'objective' law refers explicitly to a kind of 'social consensus'....").
i8 See Spitko, supra note 58, at 1351 ("[B]ecause broader principles are more easily applied and
more certainly ascertainable than are narrow principles, Justice Scalia's approach exacerbates the
uncertainty inherent in any tradition-based analysis... .
185 Supra pp.3-9.
1g6 See Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 799 (1983) ("The ways in which people understand the world give
meaning to the words that they use, and only by recreating such global understandings can we interpret
the document
the framers wrote.").
197

Id. at 800.

1s8 See Spitko, supra note 58, at 1351 (stating critics' argument that the hermeneutic approach
fails as a limitation on the judiciary because a juror reconstructs the world of the past by using his own
contemporary world view).
1
See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (stating that such a right is rationally connected
to a governmental interest in promoting and preserving the welfare of the child).
190 Id. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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follow Justice Scalia's approach if they are concerned about their legacy, not
to mention their portraits.19' If the alleged right is initially defined narrowly
as Justice Scalia would have it, judges run the risk of abdicating their
Constitutional role as the Court did in Lochner. Justice Scalia's approach
ignores the reality that the rights originate in the People's values, developed
through discourse, 92 and the Constitution demands protection of these rights.
Narrow definitions have this effect because an asserted right is
protected under modem due process only if it is fundamental, if it is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and traditions. Yet protecting tradition means
protecting the status quo. 193 A claimed right to act is part of the Nation's
"tradition" "only if it is supported by a stable consensus for a substantial
period of time," and a consensus exists "only if virtually everyone accepts
it.' 194
In other words, "traditions require the continuous support of a
supermajority."1 95
Under this framework, narrow definitions limit courts' ability to
protect rights. 196 Often, the claimed right, narrowly defined, is the result of
new developments in society, a society that did not exist in the Nation's
"history." For example, in Glucksberg, a case involving the right to
physician-assisted suicide, the Court noted that the litigants were in court
simply for the reason that "[b]ecause of advances in medicine and
technology, Americans today are increasingly likely to die in institutions,
from chronic illnesses."' 197 Also, the litigant is in court because they are
191
This is a blithe reference to the "Dorian Gray Theory of Constitutional Jurisprudence." See
Christopher Eisgruber, Comment, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10 CONST. 37, 37-38
(1993) ("The jurisprudential sins of judges are, apparently, visited on their portraits.").
192
See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 876-77 (stating that Lochner embodies less an active judicial
rule and more conceptions of neutrality and has not been entirely overruled); Supra, pp. 9-10.
193
See Greenberger, supra note 169, at 1023 ("[A]ppeals to tradition are backward-looking and
tend to enshrine the status quo ....");see also, Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and
The Rule Of Law, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 991, 1001-16 (1994) ("[Alccording to Justice Scalia, the
purpose of substantive due process 'is to prevent future generations from tightly casting aside important
traditional values-not to enable this Court to invent new ones.'").
194 Tom Stacy, Death, Privacy, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 77 CORNELL L REV. 490, 553
(1992).
195

Id. at 553.

See id. at 917 ("If the focus is on tradition at the most specific level of analysis, there will be
relatively little judicial protection of rights."); see also Robin West, The Ideal of Liberty: A Comment on
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1373, 1374 (1991) ("The interpretation of liberty and hence
of substantive due process espoused by Justice Scalia in Michael H. is so narrow that if embraced by the
Court it would lead to the effective end of the doctrine."). Novel claims can be wedged into traditional
notions of rights if both the asserted rights and extant traditions are defined broadly, such as the right to
liberty. See Chemerinsky, supra note 171, at 910 ("At the highest level of abstraction, the framers sought
to protect values such as liberty and equality; and virtually any decision can be reconciled with this
abstract intent.").
197
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 716 (1997); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
302 (1993) (describing the right of immigrant minors to be temporarily release from state custody into the
custody of a responsible adult versus the right to be free of physical restraint); Moore v. East City of
196
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seeking to engage in previously unprotected activity. Such activity, defined
narrowly, is by definition not part of tradition; if the right were 198
already
traditionally protected, the litigant would have no need to be in court.
Justice Scalia's approach, by immediately and exclusively defining
the claimed right and relevant tradition narrowly, prevents judges from
giving effect to the People's changing definitions of rights because these
changes are inherently not rooted in tradition. The protection of the status
quo is antithetical to the judiciary's duty to properly balance the
Constitutional principles of liberty and equality, and abdicates the
institutional role the Constitution assigns to the judiciary. 199 This was the
same mistake the Lochner court made.2 °° For these reasons, I answer
Professor Chemerinsky's question "[ills it a sufficient justification for the
rejection of a constitutional right that it has not been traditionally
safeguarded?" in the negative under Justice Scalia's approach.20 '
As Justice Souter pointed out in his concurrence in Glucksberg,20 2 a
survey of modem due process cases, starting with Griswold v. Connecticut,
bears out that narrow definitions of asserted rights and extant traditions
stifles judicial protection of rights.20 3 In Griswold, the Appellants were
convicted under a statute prohibiting any person to give information,
instruction, or medical advice about contraceptives, or the contraceptive
itself to anyone else.20 4 The Appellants claimed that this statute violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Reversing their conviction, the Court found that
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (finding that a housing ordinance that expressly selects certain
categories of relatives who may live together and declares that others may not is unconstitutional).
198 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 140-41 (1989) ("[T]he plurality acts as if the only
purpose of the Due Process Clause is to confirm the importance of interests already protected by a
majority of the States.") (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 171, at 903
("[UIncreasingly, the Court uses tradition as a limit on the Constitution's meaning.").
199

See supra pp. 2-3; see also Spitko, supra note 58, at 1353 ("The fourteenth amendment was

meant to protect minorities from oppression by the majority.").
201

Supra, Part Ill.
Chemerinsky, supranote 171, at 907.

202

See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 765 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[Tihe balance of which I speak is

200

the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it

developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing." (quoting Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
203
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (finding that the Connecticut law
forbidding use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intruded upon the right of marital privacy because
such a relationship was "intimate to the degree of being sacred"). In Griswold, defendants appealed
convictions of violating the Connecticut birth control law. Id. at 480. The Appellants claimed that this
statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Reversing their conviction, the Court found that "specific

guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance." Id. at 484. These various guarantees create zones of privacy protected from
governmental intrusion, because without the peripheral rights of privacy, "the specific rights would be less

secure." id.
204
Id. at 480.
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20 5
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
These various guarantees create zones of privacy protected from
governmental intrusion, because without the peripheral rights of privacy,
"the specific rights would be less secure." 2°6 Finally, the Court ruled that the
criminal statute involved concerned and limited a relationship lying within
one of these zones of privacy, the marital relationship. Because such a
relationship was "intimate to the degree of being sacred," the
statute
20 7
improperly limited a "right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights."
However, there was a strong tradition in the Nation's history of
prohibiting the use of contraceptives. 0 8 Although Justice Scalia, in Michael
H., argued that he could have upheld the decision in Griswold because the
statutes had not been recently enforced and did not represent a "still extant"
tradition, 2° 9 the facts of the case before him belie these very claims. 210 The
litigants were in court precisely because the statutes prohibiting the use of
contraceptives had been enforced. Faithful adherence to Justice Scalia's
approach calls for overturning Griswold.
Nor could Justice Scalia have struck down the anti-miscegenation
law involved in the 1967 case Loving v. Virginia.2 1t Had the Court identified
the right involved at its most specific level, the right to interracial marriage,
and ended there, the Nation's traditions and history of prohibiting such
marriages would have forced the Court to uphold the law. Instead, the Court
recognized that the People no longer accepted such limitations on marriage
(only 16 states still prohibited miscegenation), defined the right involved
broadly as the right to marriage, and struck the law down.2 12
Justice Scalia's approach would have likewise reversed the decision

Id. at 484.
Id. at 483.
207 Id. at 486.
208 See id. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (describing the state interest in safeguarding marital
205
206

fidelity).
209

See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) ("[None of those cases
acknowledged a longstanding and still extant societal tradition withholding the very right pronounced to
be the subject of a liberty interest and then rejected it.").
210 Given that anti-sodomy laws were almost never enforced from their start, much less recently,
one also wonders why, if Justice Scalia was honest in Micheal H. about this, he voted in Lawrence as he
did.
211 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that miscegenation statutes adopted by

Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely on basis of racial classification violate the equal
protection and due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment). In Loving, the proceeding was on a motion
to vacate sentences for violating state ban on interracial marriages. Id. at 3. The Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals affirmed the convictions. Id The Supreme Court, in reversing the convictions, found that
miscegenation statutes adopted by Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely on basis of racial
classification violate equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 12.
212

id.
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in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.2 13 In Moore, the Court struck down a
housing ordinance limiting the occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a
single family as applied to a woman living with her son and two grandsons,
one of whom was the son's nephew. Because there was no tradition of
protecting the narrowly defined right, the right of an elderly woman to
permanently "share a single kitchen and a suite of contiguous rooms with
some of her relatives, 214 the Court, using Justice Scalia's approach, would
have been unable to uphold the broader rights of using
one's property as one
216
sees fit,2 15 or the right to live together as a family.
The seminal case displaying the inadequacies of Justice Scalia's
approach is Bowers v. Hardwick.2 17 In Bowers, a practicing homosexual man
brought an action challenging the constitutionally of a Georgia statute
prohibiting homosexual sodomy. 218 The Court, effectively using Justice
Scalia's approach, defined the claimed right as the right to engage in
homosexual sodomy, rather than a broader right to dictate the form of one's
intimate relations or right to liberty in personal relationships. 2 9 Finding no
tradition prohibiting limits of the narrowly defined right, the Court upheld
the statue despite evidence that a substantial minority of Americans
disagreed with the decision.22 °
In fact, Justice Scalia's approach effectively requires minorities to
obtain a supermajority to gain its rights through judicial policymaking. 221 In
such a case, the minority will get their rights only through democratic action,
if ever. Yet the Constitution demands that our government protect these
rights far before this point precisely because such democratic action might
not take place, even though the People have created the right through
See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S 494, 506 (finding that the ordinance in question,

213

violated due process).

In Moore, a homeowner was convicted in Ohio court of violating East Cleveland

housing ordinance which limits occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family and
recognizes as a "family" only a few categories of related individuals. Id. at 496. The Court of Appeals of

Ohio, Cuyahoga County, affirmed, and the homeowner appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction and held that the ordinance in question, under which it was crime for homeowner to have
living with her a son and grandson plus a second grandson who was cousin of her first grandson, violated
due process. Id. at 506.
214

Id. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 513 (Stevens, J.., concurring).

Id. at 500 (majority opinion).
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See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 220 (1986) (finding that Georgia's sodomy statute did

not violate the fundamental rights of homosexuals).
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Id. at 189.
See id. at 190 (finding that the Federal Constitution does not allow the right of privacy to

extend to homosexual sodomy).
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See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (noting that the number of states with

sodomy laws was decreasing dramatically at the time Bowers was handed down, and these laws in effect
were rarely enforced).
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agreement in discourse.22 2 Thus, Justice Scalia's answer to the levels of
generality problem is insufficient to avoid the lessons of Lochner: judicial
discretion must be restrained, and judges must recognize that the People
create rights, even rights not reflected in democratic action.
The Court explicitly rejected Justice Scalia's approach in Casey.2 23
Yet it did so without offering a substitute that would adequately rein in
judicial discretion, instead, as shown, leaving it up to judges themselves to
define the right narrowly or broadly. And courts should not adopt the
opposite approach, initially and exclusively defining the claimed right and
relevant tradition broadly, because it is as equally unworkable as Justice
Scalia's approach. If judges define the right and tradition broadly, they will
simply grant every claim that comes forward as falling under the traditionally
protected "right to liberty., 224 "Rights do not become fundamental simply
because they are asserted by nonconformist groups., 225 What is needed is a
rule that reins in judicial discretion more than the modem approach, but still
gives protection to rights newly created by the People through discourse.
V. A New Approach: Using Culture to Determine Whether to Define the
Right Narrowly or Broadly
To reconcile the still unresolved tensions inherent in modem
substantive due process jurisprudence, judges should be cautious and
"participate, with sensitivity to [their] own role and [their] limits, in the
ongoing social process of structuring the roles of others in accord with the
226
contemporary significance of our collective past, called the Constitution.,
To thus sensitively participate, I propose a theory, cultural substantive due
process, of how judges should decide whether to define a claimed right and
its relevant tradition broadly or narrowly.
In any given case, judges should initially define the claimed right
and tradition as Justice Scalia would, referring "to the most specific level at
222
223

Supra, pp. 9-10.
See Sullivan, supra note 94, at 79 (noting that "[tihe Casey joint opinion explicitly rejected

Justice Scalia's 'specific tradition' rule in favor of Justice Harlan's more standard-like interpretative
method"); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 171, at 903 (stating that the Supreme Court opinions tend to
place greater reliance on history and tradition for their constitutional interpretations and "the Court uses
tradition as a limit on the Constitution's meaning").
224 See Chemerinsky, supra note 171, at 910 (noting that the framers' specific intent did not
contemplate modem issues).
225 Cook, supra note 164, at 867.
226

Note, Substantive Due Process-Eleventh Circuit Upholds Florida Statute Barring Gays from

Adopting-Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services, 538 F.3d 804 (11th Cir.
2004), 117 HARv. L. REV. 2791, 2798 (2004) (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972
Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV.1, 52
(1973)).
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which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted
right can be identified., 227 Using this definition of the right, judges should
look to the current views of the People, not tradition, and determine to what
extent and in what number the People have decided, through agreement from
discourse, the claimed right is actually a Constitutional right an individual
possesses. If a substantial minority of the People agree that the right
narrowly defined should be protected, judges should uphold the right. I
define a substantial minority as the number of people agreeing with the
arguments of the social movement advancing the right such that support for
the movement has passed a "tipping point" and will not regress. When
writing the opinion, judges should define the right broadly and link it to
broad, traditionally protected rights, such as the right to liberty or the right to
"determine the meaning of the universe." To justify these conclusions, the
judges should use arguments advanced by the substantial minority, as well as
a discussion of the current social consensus on the issue. If the claimed right
does not enjoy such popular support, judges, when writing the opinion,
should define the right narrowly and find no relevant tradition protecting it.
To justify these conclusions, judges should use arguments advanced by the
discriminating majority and a discussion of the lack of social consensus.
Such an approach limits the discretion of judges by creating a constitutional
law rooted in culture. As a result, it protects liberty and advances equality in
the manner the Constitution demands of the judiciary.
Adjusting the modem substantive due process jurisprudence in this
way enables the Court to avoid Lochner's mistakes. First, this approach
retains appeals to social consensus as an external, objective restraint on
judicial discretion because it relies on the political perspective of the People
in determining the Constitutional scope of governmental power. Secondly,
by acting on behalf of an individual in the place of static executive or
legislative branches, the cultural substantive due process approach allows the
Court to fulfill its institutional duty, as articulated in Part H, and properly
balance the Constitutional principles of liberty and equality.2 28 Rather than
shutting the government down, a hostile judiciary forces the government and
people to act:2 29 the discriminating majority either convinces individuals
within the substantial minority that the right they claim is invalid such that
the minority becomes insubstantial, or the majority recognizes the errors of

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
See Keith Whittington, Yet Another ConstitutionalCrisis?, 43 WM.AND MARY L. REV. 2093,
2103 (2002) (""[Gliven the fixed term of presidential office and independent electoral mandate, it is
possible that a president can survive alongside hostile legislatures, leading to stalemates between the
executive and the legislative branch.... Under such conditions, no one can govern."').
229
Id. at 2133.
227
228

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

its ways and capitulates. 230 Thus, the cultural substantive due process
principle requires the People, through the legislature and executive, to act
both discursively and politically when limiting a group's or individual's
liberty.23'
Although this may run the risk of strengthening the political will of
the entrenched majority, as many argue Roe did,232 the benefits of the
judiciary's protection of the right and invalidation of an intrusive statute
233
while the People engage in debate over its validity far outweigh the CoStS.
Further, this invigoration of the People's debate is precisely what the cultural
substantive due process approach intends, regardless of which side is
motivated to intensely engage in the debate.
This very debate provides a response to another critique of the
cultural substantive due process approach, namely, that having such an active
judiciary will incentivize the legislature to abdicate its law-making role.234
This argument holds that legislatively made law is the product of a complex
legislative process that involves "committees, fighting for time on the floor,
compromise because some members want some unrelated objective, passage,
[and] exposure to veto., 235 However, if Congress legislates with a
presumption that courts will fill in gaps in legislation concerning the rights of
substantial minorities, Congress "will be less likely to deliberate, at least on
the margins. ,236
This overlooks a primary benefit of the cultural substantive due
process approach; just as easily as active courts can discourage
Congressional deliberation, they can also spur the People's debate and
dialogue. A judicial decision can force the discriminating majority to decide
if it really believes the legislation is necessary. In addition, it protects the

Calabresi, supra note 147, at 107.
But see Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to Professor
Neal Katyal, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1825, 1828 (1998) (discussing his belief that judges in the role of advice
givers does not promote democracy or the effectiveness of policymaking).
232
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 139-96, 237-42 (W. W.
Norton & Company 1990) (discussing the effects of Roe, its historical significance and whether or not the
topic of abortion should be controlled by a majority vote or should be subject to Constitutional scrutiny, as
interpreted by the judiciary, beyond the "reach of all except the sort of supermajority it takes to amend the
Constitution").
233 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 856 (1992) ("The ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives.").
234 See Manning, supra note 66, at 2410 (noting that the legislative process is too complex to
allow judges to reconstruct whether Congress would have interpreted statutory construction differently
from the way it was clearly written).
23' Id. at 2409.
236 Id. at 2439.
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231

13 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SoC. JUST. 1 (2006)
Further, quiet courts stifle
minority's rights in the meantime. 217
Congressional deliberation. In the absence of court decisions, Congress has
no incentive to deliberate on minority issues, and will not bring new
protective legislation. In effect, quiet courts enable Congress to legislate
with a presumption that the status quo, rather than the courts, will fill in gaps
in rights legislation.
Also, the cultural substantive due process approach avoids the
objection that, in a democracy, the judiciary lacks a proper basis of authority
to require Congress to take a second look;238 the authority of the judiciary to
require a second look under the cultural substantive due process approach is
based on the views of the People, rather than judges. Thus, judges can
protect the rights of individuals without destroying the idea of self-rule that
is so crucial to democracy, and they avoid the mistake of Lochner. In short,
this approach enables courts to ensure the law enshrines the People's vision
judges to ensure the law tells
of a "citizen," while at the same time allowing
239
the discriminating majority what a citizen is.
Further, judges are able to engage in the cultural substantive due
process approach. Although formulating the "most specific level" of the
claimed right is a value-laden judgment that seemingly fails to rein in
judicial discretion 240 and undermines the rule of law because it "excuses the
need to justify the value judgments which are actually being made and would
otherwise be difficult to defend,, 24 1 some ways of defining rights are more
specific than others. Taking the right at issue in Michael H. as an example:
"'[aldulterous natural fathers' is more specific than 'natural fathers,'
'parents,' or 'family.' ' ,242 While there may be some room for disagreement
at the margins, the amount of discretion granted to judges at this level of the
cultural substantive due process approach is far from unlimited, significant,
or substantial. The cultural substantive due process approach requires judges
to be intellectually honest and adopt the most specific description that
describes the situation.
237

See supra p. 10 (stating especially when the call is a close one, the preferable choice is to force

the discriminating majority to convincingly win the dialogue rather than to risk allowing an intrusive
statute to stand).
238

Mikva, supra note 230, at 1825.

239

See Radin, supra note 69, at 124 (describing the relationship between laws and citizens in that

legal rules teach citizens who they are in order to encourage them to live up to the values they profess are
important to them and to aid in the expression of who they are and what they value. "In our democracy,

the relationship between government and citizens is not just the 'we-they' relationship embodied in the
traditional rule of law. Rather 'we'-in some sense that we don't want to lose-are still 'We the People,'

the governors as well as the governed").
240 Greenberger, supra note 169170, at 1029.
241 Id. at 984.
242

Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term Foreword,The Justices of Rules and

Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 78 (1992).
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Further limiting this modest amount of discretion is the fact that
judges are concerned with the legacy they leave to history, and they do not
want their decisions to be overturned.2 43 In short, they want to make "right"
decisions. Yet under Justice Scalia's approach, there is no way to determine
whether or not a given judge's definition of the right is correct. To use
Habermas, there is no fact external to the judge's statement to which we can
point to show a given judge's reinterpretation of history or definition of the
right is true. It is simply a subjective-emotive statement that is either
sincerely made or not. But it is not true. Thus, the desire to make "right"
decisions does not constrain a judge under Justice Scalia's approach. If
anything, it encourages the judge to rule as a plutocrat.
Under the cultural substantive due process approach, however, there
is such an external validating reference: the continued existence, or nonexistence, of the substantial minority at issue. A description of the asserted
right that is too narrow causes the judge to undercount the number of people
supporting that right. This, in turn, causes a judge to deny the asserted right
even though a substantial minority supports it. Because a substantial
minority is a social movement that will not regress in support, the continued
existence and growth of the group asserting the right even after an
unfavorable decision verifies that a judge's definition of the asserted right
was too narrow. Likewise, the continued existence of a substantial minority
after a judge upholds an asserted right evinces that a judge's definition of the
Unlike Justice Scalia's approach, the cultural
asserted right was correct.2
constrains judges by their desire to make
approach
process
due
substantive
"right" decisions.
Finally, the hermeneutic problem applies only to Justice Scalia's
approach. The use of a narrow definition of the right under the cultural
substantive due process approach is justified by the need to adequately
determine what the People's conclusions from discourse today have to say
about the specific case before a court. It is not used, unlike Justice Scalia's
approach, to determine what the People's conclusions were in cases from the
far distant past.
See Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between Judicial
Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1757-58 (2004) ("A judge's place in the
constitutional structure and judicial hierarchy, a judge's relationship with litigants and lawyers, and a
judge's stature in the legal community and broader polity help to explain both why judges tend to limit
themselves to the cases before them and why judges are constrained by existing legal materials in the
course of deciding those cases.").
244 Further, because the cultural substantive due process approach simply calls on judges to
identify social movements that have already crossed the threshold of not declining, judicial decisions will
not be determinative of which social movements survive and which do not. "The Supreme Court.. .speaks
in the collective name of the People; it interprets the People's past achievements and does not try to
speculate about the unknowable future." Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1438.
243
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The cultural substantive due process approach does create the
possibility that judges might improperly overturn democratic legislation by
simply misjudging whether a substantial minority exists, undermining both
the judiciary's Constitutional role and the foundation of our government.245
Yet this overemphasizes the judiciary.
First, although there is no magic amount of political support a case
needs for a judge to ascertain whether it can grant a rights claim, giving the
fecund and sagacious judges of the judiciary this level of responsibility for
fact finding is but a trifle conveyance of political power. Judges make
findings of fact all the time and are as able to participate in and understand
political culture as legislators or executives. The small risk that judges will
incorrectly determine whether a substantial minority exists is greatly
outweighed by the large benefits of this principle, namely that it both limits
judicial discretion and allows the judiciary to fulfill its Constitutional duty to
balance equality and liberty.
Second, it is important to note that even though the Supreme Court
still exercises judicial and political discretion to grant certiorari under the
cultural substantive due process approach, federal district courts and state
courts do not. Those courts must instead rely on individuals, members of
democratic society, to bring claims before them. These individuals will in
turn make a political calculus as to whether it is advantageous to their cause
to bring a Constitutional claim. For instance, Matthew Coles, director of the
ACLU's Lesbian and Gay Rights Project, has said although there is no
"magic number" of states that need to approve same-sex marriage before the
issue should go before the Supreme Court, this bears heavily on his decision
as to whether to bring a claim or not. "We think, strategically, bringing a
federal claim for marriage now is not a wise idea," Coles said. "The Supreme
Court is the country's institutional conscience, and if you lose there, I think
that sets you back."246 Often, judges will only be reviewing cases in which a
substantial minority exists, or at least thinks it exists. This built-in filter will
limit the opportunity for mistake.
Third, Lochner illustrates judicial decisions are often unable to affect
profoundly the direction of society. Lochner neither caused nor could have
prevented the Great Depression, even though, as Justice Brandeis points out,
247
the philosophy underpinning the decision may have.
Rather, judicial
245
See David Crump, How Do The Courts Really Discover Unenumerated FundamentalRights?
Cataloguing The Methods Of JudicialAlchemy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 795, 867 (1996) (arguing

that judicial restraint protects legislative decision-making).
246
Case Reveals Split in Gay Marriage Fight, AP, Apr. 3, 2006, available at
http://www.rainbowguide.com/news/040306-1.php (last visited on Nov. 6, 2006) (on file with author).
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See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 307 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

(stating in 1932 that "most [economists] realize that failure to distribute widely the profits of industry has

been a prime cause of our present plight.").
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decisions are made in time, scholars and society develop new understandings
of the way the world works, and no one case or philosophy lasts forever.
History will moderate decisions over time.248 A miscalculation by judges
will simply force the majority to become more active in developing
arguments showing why the substantial minority's claims are
In other words, a miscalculation will simply spur
unreasonable.249
democratic action and debate. If the discriminating majority's reasons for
discriminating are indeed the best arguments, they will win in the discourse
and the substantial minority will disappear as individuals defect from the
cause. When this minority disappears, the discriminating majority can again
pass discriminating legislation and defend it in court.250 For these reasons,

v. Board of Education there is a Dred Scott or
the fear that "for every Brown
25 1
a Plessy," rings hollow.

This last suggestion may lead some to argue that the cultural
substantive due process approach invites too frequent legal change.252 At
first blush, the cultural substantive due process approach seems to enable the
discriminating majority to simply reenact discriminatory law (requiring
minorities to relitigate the protection of their right) until public opinion has
changed such that courts overturn themselves and uphold the legislation.
Precedent carries no weight, and courts can overrule itself with impunity,
creating inconsistency. This will all result in a judiciary that can no longer
command respect from the other branches of government. This is a long way
of arguing the cultural substantive due process approach violates the Rule of
Law, which requires judges to create consistent rules,253 based on publicly
articulated reasons,254 that are capable of guiding individuals' actions.255

248

See MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY,

ADVENTURES

OF THE DIALECTIC 72 (J. Bien trans.,

Northwestern University Press 1973) (1955) in Steven Winter, Indeterminancy and IncommensurabilityIn
ConstitutionalLaw, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1540 (1990) (stating that "history eliminates the irrational; but
the rational remains to be created and to be imagined."); see also Molot, supra note 242, at 1758 (stating
'when one looks beyond the institutional setting in which judges approach pending cases and considers
the evolution of legal doctrine over time, one finds a system that minimizes the harm that any single
judge, or generation of judges, may do.").
249 See Whittington, supra note 227, at 2133 (noting that Franklin Roosevelt was ultimately
successful in overcoming the Supreme Court's resistance to New Deal policies).
2M
Historically, the majority has always fought to maintain the status quo. See Eskridge, supra
note 126, at 2065 ("At every stage, [social movements] were confronted with a politics of preservation
251 Friedman, supra note 8, at 1270-71.
252 See Breyer, supra note 4, at 119 ("Too radical, too frequent legal change has ...a tendency to

undercut. . .important law-related human needs," such as the "need for predictability, the need for
stability," and the "need to plan in reliance upon law.").
253 Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
581, 588 (1990).
254 See Owen Fiss, The Fallibilityof Reason, in BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY
84, 94 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) ("The strength of a decision, its authoritative character, and its claim
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This criticism is trenchant, but again misses the mark. The
requirement that judicial decisions be principled or consistent sets the bar
rather low. "[A]n opinion that holds that the rich must always win (or
always lose, for that matter) is not unprincipled., 256 It may be a terrible
principle, "[b]ut its problem is not that it is lacking in principle.",257 The
cultural substantive due process approach, then, does not violate the rule of
law because it does set out a consistent principle by which judges should
make substantive due process decisions. Judges will always uphold an
alleged right which is backed by a substantial minority that has reached the
"tipping point" after which it is unlikely the minority will lose ground in the
People's discourse. In turn, this can guide individual action because the
People can gauge popular support for a claimed right themselves, and can
thus predict a judge's decision. Yet this is not quite a satisfactory answer.
Rather, it is precisely well-principled consistency, the "rationality
intrinsic to the form of law itself that secures the legitimacy of power
exercised, 258 in a judicial decision, that gives a decision "[its] strength... its
authoritative character, and its claim for respect." 259
By frankly
acknowledging the political underpinnings of a judge's decision, one might
argue the cultural substantive due process approach may "simultaneously
undermin[e] the [judiciary's] authority to speak as the 'instrument []' of a
law that is known and fixed, in which 'principle and logic' entirely determine
'the decisions of [courts]."'

26

However, for two reasons, it improves the

ability of the judiciary to speak as the authoritative instrument of law.
First, as Part 11 explains, and as critical legal studies and legal
realism attest, it is far from clear that judicial decisions rest on principles of
reason and logic as opposed to political calculations.2 6' Current approaches,
which refuse to recognize this fact, produce unflinchingly authoritative
for respect stem. . .from their capacity to justify the decision on the basis of publicly articulated

reasons.").
255
See Segall, supra note 192, at 995. (noting that "law should be such that people will be able to
be guided by it" (citing JOSEPH RAz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAw 213
(1979))).
256
Guido Calabresi, In Partial(but not Partisan) Praise of Principle, in BUSH v. GORE: THE
QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 67, 72 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002).

257 Id. at 72.
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Jirgen Habermas, Law and Morality, Address at The Tanner Lectures on Human Values,

Harvard University (Oct. 1-2, 1986) (Kenneth Baynes, trans.).
259
Fiss, supra note 253, at 94; see also Meyer, supra note 122, at 920 ("'The Court is most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having

little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.' If people come to believe that
the Court's constitutional command, overturning their own democratic choices, rests on nothing more than
the Justices' personal will, the judiciary invites defiance." (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
190 (1986))).
260
Post, supra note 155, at 111.
261
The Court could not have decided Brown v. Board of Education in 1890. See Tushnet, supra
note 185, at 800-801; Post, supra note 155, at I11.
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statements of law, hiding the political undercurrents of Constitutional law
behind inconsistently applied principles. One need only compare the
reasoning of Holden and Lochner, as Part Ill does, to recognize this.
However, by openly discussing the role of the People in forming
rights, courts will actually gain credibility in a way the current approaches
never can. As judges correctly pick social movements that do not disappear
and instead become part of mainstream culture, the judiciary will emerge as
an authoritative voice as to which social movements demand respect. More
importantly, as argued in Part II, social movements will survive to the extent
they articulate arguments that are agreed upon by all and win recognition of
their claimed rights for these reasons. To the extent judges pick social
movements correctly and use its arguments to justify the result, courts will
develop a coherent theory as, case by case, arguments upon which all
individuals can agree become folded into the judiciary's precedent. The
judiciary effectively builds in a coherent theory based on principle and logic
by incorporating the arguments of minority groups that win in the dialectic.
In this way, judges avoid being too positivistic; over time a moral core and
reasoning will develop in the case law.
In fact, the Court applied an approach similar to the cultural
substantive due process approach in Lawrence v. Texas,26 2 in which the
Court overruled Bowers263 and struck down a law criminalizing sodomy. In
Lawrence, John Lawrence and Tyron Garner sought to overturn their
convictions under Texas' anti-homosexual sodomy law. First, the Court
gave a short exegesis on its substantive due process history, framing each
case as protecting activity central to a broad right to liberty, autonomy, and
personal dignity. The Court then turned to describing the activity in which
Lawrence and Garner claimed a right to engage. Recognizing that "our laws
and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here," the Court
found these laws and tradition "show an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex. '2E In other words, the current culture
believed the claimed right, narrowly defined, deserved protection because it
fell under the People's notion of "liberty." The Lawrence Court realized it
had to give a voice to this substantial minority (if not majority).
The Court then defined Lawrence's asserted right extremely broadly,
as the right to make choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, rather
than simply the right to engage in homosexual sodomy. The Court held that
Lawrence's and Garner's actions were activity within the "liberty protected
262
263
264

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Id. at 559.
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by the Constitution. '' 265 The Court, using arguments put forward by
Lawrence and Garner,2s then justified this broad definition that to do
otherwise "demeans the claim the individual put forward."' 267 The claimed
right sought protection of more than the right to engage in particular sexual
activity; it sought to protect the creation of a personal bond in which the
sexual activity "can be but one element." 2"
By explicitly recognizing the importance modem attitudes play in
protecting rights, Lawrence implemented the coherent and stable approach to
substantive due process for which this paper argues. The Court limited its
discretion while still fulfilling its Constitutional role by upholding a claimed
minority right only after analyzing the current social consensus surrounding
protection of the right. Additionally, the Court justified this outcome using
not only arguments advanced by the substantial minority, but also an explicit
discussion of the opinion's political underpinnings.
VI. Conclusion
Throughout this paper, I have argued that the revelations of
discourse ethics have profound implications for the Court's substantive due
process analysis. The People create rights through discourse, yet not all of
these rights are protected through democratic processes. The Constitution,
however, viewed through a dialectic lens, demands that the Court protect
rights claims before the democratic process protects them. To fulfill this
duty without losing important limits on judicial discretion, the judiciary can
no longer proceed as if its Constitutional decision-making is completely
detached from politics. By recognizing this and explicitly acknowledging it
in its opinions, the judiciary will be able to fulfill its Constitutional
obligation to protect minority rights in a restrained manner compatible with a
democratic society.
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